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Abstract:
Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems have been used to investigate insight 
problem solving using both behavioral and neuroimaging techniques. However, it is 
unclear to what extent CRA problems exhibit characteristics of insight such as impasses 
and restructuring. CRA problem-solving characteristics were examined in a study in 
which participants solved CRA problems while providing concurrent verbal protocols. 
The results show that solutions subjectively judged as insight by participants do exhibit 
some characteristics of insight. However, the results also show that there are at least 
two different ways in which people experience insight when solving CRA problems. 
Sometimes problems are solved and judged as insight when the solution is the first 
thing considered, but these solutions do not exhibit any characteristics of insight aside 
from the “Aha!” experience. In other cases, the solution is derived after a longer period 
of problem solving, and the solution process more closely resembles insight as it is has 
been traditionally defined in the literature. The results show that separating these two 
types of solution processes may provide a better understanding of the behavioral and 
neuroanatomical correlates of insight solutions.
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Introduction
Problem solving is an everyday experience that normally enables people to achieve their 
goals. However, reaching an impasse in problem solving where one does not know how 
to proceed is common. The experience of insight is associated with suddenly overcoming 
a prior problem-solving impasse to find a solution (Ohlsson, 1992), but the factors that 
lead to the phenomenological “Aha!” experience are not fully understood. Insight can 
be defined by both phenomenological and cognitive features. Phenomenologically, the 
source of insight solutions is often hard for the problem solver to identify and reaching 
the solution is associated with an affective response of suddenness and surprise (the “Aha!” 
Experience). From a problem-solving perspective, insight solutions often occur after an 
impasse and are obtained through restructuring the representation of a problem (e.g., 
Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Ohlsson, 1992; Schooler, Fallshore, & Fiore, 
1995). In other words, the key components of insight are often described as impasse, 
restructuring, and “Aha!”.
Many types of problems have been used to study insight. Classic insight problems 
have been used extensively, and sometimes the reason for their use is solely based on 
the fact that they previously have been used to study insight (Weisberg, 1995). With the 
emergence of neuroimaging techniques (e.g., functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
[fMRI] and Electroencephalography [EEG]), new problems and paradigms have been used 
to investigate insight (e.g., Bowden et al., 2005). Classic insight problems simply take too 
long to solve to be useful stimuli for these methodologies. One specific problem type that 
has been used to examine insight problem solving is the compound remote associate 
(CRA) problem (Bowden & Beeman, 1998; Bowden et al., 2005; Bowers, Regehr, Balthaz-
ard, & Parker 1990; Jung-Beemåan et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Razumnikova, 2007; 
Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2009; Wiley, 1998). The CRA task, created 
by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (1998; 2003b), is a modification of the remote associates 
task (RAT) created by Mednick (1962). CRA problems involve finding the one word that 
can form a compound word or phrase with each of three different words. For example, if 
three words—tree, sauce, and big—are presented, the solution is apple. CRA problems 
are solved much faster than classic insight problems, and individual CRA problems can 
be solved by insight or by noninsight search processes (e.g., generate-and-test or trial-
and-error) regardless of the number of CRA problems that have been solved on previous 
trials (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007). 
CRA problems are hybrid-type problems because they can be solved through either 
insight or noninsight processes, as opposed to many classic problems that are pure insight 
problems in which solving them means an insight occurred (Weisberg, 1995). Bowden and 
Jung-Beeman (2003a) have found that people can make a subjective distinction between 
a search, or noninsight, solution to CRA problems and an insight solution process that 
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elicits an affective “Aha!” experience. Because of their hybrid nature, CRA problems can be 
used in neuroimaging studies to examine the neural correlates of insight by subtracting 
activation associated with noninsight solutions from activation associated with insight 
solutions (e.g., Cranford & Moss, 2011; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006). 
Given their use in studies of insight, evaluating the differences between classic insight 
problems and CRA problems is important for relating results from CRA problem solving 
to findings using classic insight problems. The present study investigates insight in CRA 
problem solving through the examination of participants’ concurrent verbal protocols 
recorded during problem-solving efforts.
CRA Problem Solving and Characteristics of Insight
Schooler et al. (1995) suggested that insight should be understood by what happens 
rather than what is experienced. In problem solving, the solver moves from an initial state 
described by the problem statement to a goal state in which a solution has been obtained 
(Newell & Simon, 1972). RAT problem solving can be described as a search through 
knowledge in the form of a problem space (Newell, 1990; Smith, 1995a). Prior studies of 
CRA problem solving have found that solvers appear to use a generate-and-test strategy 
in which the solver tries to recall words (e.g., maple) that are associated with one of the 
problem words (e.g. tree) and then tests if the word can be combined with the other two 
problem words (Moss, 2006; Moss, Kotovsky, & Cagan, 2007). Figure 1 shows an example 
of this behavior in three protocols. If the solver finds that the word does not fit, then he/
she may try to generate other words that are associates of “tree” or, instead, try to find 
words that go with one of the other two problem words. This method may continue until 
the solution is found.
Although CRA problems do involve problem-solving processes, it is difficult to assess 
objectively whether insight actually occurs at solution. Currently, the best way to assess 
whether the solution to an individual CRA problem occurred with or without insight is to 
rely on participants’ subjective ratings of whether they solved the problem with insight 
or not (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007). Rating a solution as insight does not guarantee 
that impasse and restructuring processes associated with the traditional view of insight 
truly occurred. However, Bowden and colleagues (2003b; 2005; 2007) claim CRA problems 
exhibit phenomenological features and components of insight found in classic insight 
problems and, therefore, can be used to study insight. The characteristics they claim are 
that the processes leading to solution are often unreportable, the problems misdirect (or 
fail to direct) retrieval processes, and solvers report an “Aha!” experience. Nevertheless, 
when a solver reports solving a CRA problem with insight, there should be characteristic 
evidence of insight-related processes within the problem-solving process or at the very 
least something which allows for a subjective distinction to be made.
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Phenomenological characteristics
Some research has described insight solely by the problem solvers’ unique experience (Gick 
& Lockhart, 1995; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Schooler et al., 1995). Sometimes referred to as the 
illumination stage (Smith, 1995b), the “Aha!” experience is the moment a problem solver 
feels the suddenness of surprise. The experience develops from the sudden emergence of 
the correct solution to a problem in consciousness (Ohlsson, 1992; Schooler et al., 1995). 
The “Aha!” experience is often characterized as sudden and surprising, nonconscious, 
and unintended (i.e., the solver does not intentionally try to solve the problem through 
insightful processes; Bowden et al., 2005; Ohlsson, 1984; Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2008).
When CRA problems are solved, solvers likely base their subjective ratings of whether 
the problem was insightful or not on this “Aha!” experience. The rating instructions used in 
prior studies (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006), and the present study, 
emphasize that decisions of insight be based on the sudden and surprising feeling of an 
insight that a solver experiences. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, “insight solu-
tions” are those solutions that were reported as being solved with insight by the partici-
pant, which are distinguished from problems reported as being solved without insight 
(termed “noninsight solutions”) by the sudden and surprising “Aha!” experience that the 
participant feels at solution. If this phenomenological response is the only basis that 
Figure 1. Example verbal protocols of CRA problem solving. The problems on the left 
and middle are solved with insight and classified as nonimmediate solutions. The 
problem on the right was solved with noninsight and classified as a nonimmediate 
solution. Asterisks indicate evidence of Restructuring. Solution candidates are in 
italics. Repeated solution candidates are underlined. G = Regenerating Impasse; N = 
No new Impasse; F = Frustration Impasse; D = Discontinuing Impasse.
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participants use to judge a solution as involving insight, then solutions are categorized 
as insight solutions and noninsight solutions without relying on any information about 
whether other component processes of insight were involved in attaining the solution.
The main goal of the research reported in this paper was to examine the character-
istics of observable problem-solving behavior that explain whether a solution is subjec-
tively classified as insight or noninsight. In other words, are there characteristics—such as 
reaching an impasse or restructuring the representation of the problem—that would help 
to clarify why a problem solver will subjectively classify a problem as insight? A detailed 
examination of the solution process may reveal that multiple types of problem-solving 
processes underlie the subjective experience leading to an insight classification for a 
solved problem. For example, CRA solutions are sometimes the very first candidate word 
that a person generates. In this case, a solver may report insight simply because the solu-
tion was sudden even though it did not require any impasses or restructuring processes. 
In fact, in the study presented here, two types of problem-solving processes leading to 
an insight classification are observed: the first type includes solutions in which the first 
candidate solution generated was the correct solution (these solutions are simply sud-
den and surprising and, for this paper, are termed “immediate” solutions) and the second 
type includes solutions in which the first candidate solution was incorrect (these solutions 
may require both “Aha!” and restructuring and, for this paper, are termed “nonimmediate” 
solutions). Solutions in which the first candidate generated is correct cannot contain any 
observable components of insight other than an “Aha!” experience. However, when the 
solution is not the first candidate generated, there may be other observable components 
of insight that predict when a solution is classified as insight.
To date, no research has assessed whether solutions rated as being solved with insight 
are characterized by more observable components of insight than noninsight CRA solu-
tions. Two components of insight that are not discussed in prior CRA insight/noninsight 
research are impasses and restructuring.
Impasses
People start to solve a problem with an initial representation of how to solve it. However, 
the objects, operators, and constraints of a problem produce multiple sources of difficulty, 
hindering the formation of the correct representation and ultimately the correct answer 
(Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Ohlsson, 1992). In an impasse, the solver is either unable to 
continue with productive problem solving or chooses not to, and an impasse is often a 
result of an overly constrained representation (Schooler et al., 1995). Either the solver feels 
he/she has exhausted all available options and can think of nothing else to try or he/she 
becomes fixated on the wrong objects, relations, or operators. Either way, the impasse 
is unwarranted in that a solution exists and the solver has the ability to solve it (Ohlsson, 
1992).
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Based on Ohlsson’s (1992) description of impasse, Fleck and Weisberg (2004) per-
formed a verbal protocol analysis of insight problem solving and produced a list of criteria 
that represent behaviors typical of impasses (see their Table 2, p.998). The present study 
uses similar impasse coding criteria for concurrent verbal protocols of CRA problem solving. 
Sometimes solvers may cease making progress in solving a CRA problem. Three examples 
of this behavior are evident in CRA problem solving. First, a solver may read the problem 
words three or more times in succession without generating a solution candidate (termed 
rereading in our coding scheme). Second, they may completely stop solving the problem 
altogether without record of any problem-solving behavior (termed discontinuing). Third, 
a solver may produce no new solution candidates for an extended period of time (termed 
no-new). Given the short time required to solve many CRA problems, a no-new impasse 
was coded if a period of 10 seconds elapsed without producing a new candidate solution. 
Two other behaviors are representative of impasse during CRA problem solving. First, 
if an incorrect solution is generated two or more times within a problem then this can 
be seen as a fixation on inappropriate problem elements (termed regenerating). A final 
criterion for impasse is when a solver exhibited clear signs of emotional frustration and 
experienced real difficulty with the task or specific problem (termed frustration). Each of 
the five behaviors is representative of impasse in CRA problem solving. Examples of some 
coded impasses can be seen in Figure 1.
One source of an impasse may be fixation. Fixation has been defined as the adherence 
to an inappropriate approach to solving a problem (Smith, 1995b). More generally, fixation 
can be defined as interference from previous attempts to answer the problem such that it 
becomes harder to think of new potential solutions. In CRA problem solving, retrieving an 
inappropriate solution candidate could create a fixation effect by increasing the activation 
of that item in memory. The high activation of these incorrect solution attempts then makes 
them the most likely items to be retrieved from memory on future attempts. In the present 
study, fixation was measured as the number of different candidate solutions generated 
during problem solving efforts. A smaller number of candidates generated would indicate 
greater amounts of fixation and more impasses. On the other hand, generating a greater 
number of candidates indicates less time is spent fixating on inappropriate solutions that 
lead to impasses. Getting out of an impasse does not necessarily require insight; however, 
impasses should trigger representational restructuring processes which are the basis for 
insight (Ohlsson, 1984; 1992). Therefore, greater fixation and more impasses may be more 
associated with insight solutions than noninsight solutions.
Restructuring
From the Gestalt perspective, insight occurs when a problem is solved through restruc-
turing, and restructuring can be defined as a change in the solver’s representation of the 
problem, consisting of objects in the problem, relations among the objects, operators that 
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the solver has available to apply to the objects, and the goal or solution to be obtained 
(Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012; Weisberg, 1995). Ohlsson (1992) describes three types of restructur-
ing: elaboration, re-encoding, and constraint relaxation. The three types of restructuring 
defined by Ohlsson were used as coding criteria by Fleck and Weisberg (2004). In order 
to investigate the frequency of restructuring processes in insight and noninsight solu-
tions to CRA problems, the present study employs a similar coding scheme to analyze 
the verbal protocols.
When solving a CRA problem, the solver usually tries to retrieve associates related to 
a single problem word. However, the solution only occasionally has a semantic relation to 
the base words. Solvers must consider a specific meaning or relation of a problem word in 
order to retrieve something. For example, consider an attempt to retrieve an associate of 
the word “star”. The associates, “light” or “ship”, can be retrieved if the solver considers “star” 
as a celestial body made of hot gas. If “star” is considered as a celebrity, then the associ-
ates, “super” or “movie”, can be retrieved. The space of possible candidates that are being 
examined is defined by the problem words, their currently represented meanings, and 
the current target word that the subject is using to generate a candidate. These elements 
define a space in which a memory retrieval operator can generate a candidate solution. 
A change to one of these elements leads to a different space that can be searched by the 
retrieval operator. The coding scheme for restructuring used here is based on this analysis 
of the types of representational change possible in CRA problem solving. Restructuring 
would involve searching for a change in the problem’s representation leading to a change 
in the problem’s search space (e.g., Kaplan & Simon, 1990). Because restructuring is the 
basis for insight, there should be a greater proportion of insight solutions containing 
restructuring than noninsight solutions.
Elaboration means that the current problem representation is extended or enriched 
in order to move to a representation that leads to a correct solution. Elaboration can occur 
by noticing elements of the problem that were not initially encoded. Long-term memory 
may be critical for elaboration because it is a source of additional information. In CRA 
problem solving, and in the present study, this can be seen when a solver fails to find a 
solution using one meaning of a problem word and switches to another meaning of the 
word in order to represent the problem differently. For example, in the problem [star, street, 
house], if the solver generates candidates based off the word “star”, and initially thinks 
of “star” as a celebrity, then they will not arrive at a solution. However, if a new meaning 
of the word “star” is considered, such as being a celestial body made of hot gas, then it 
is possible to arrive at the correct solution, “light”. Elaboration is therefore changing the 
possible space of retrievable candidate solution words by expanding the search space to 
new meanings of the chosen problem word being used to generate candidate solutions.
Re-encoding involves abandoning one or more components (or interpretations) 
of the current representation in order to interpret the objects/operators in a new light. 
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Through re-encoding the problem solver can form a new representation, see different 
aspects of the problem, and possibly even apply new operators to these new objects. 
The goals and prior problem states which were held in working memory fade as a solver 
abandons a search process in exploration of a different way to represent the problem, 
possibly leading to the retrieval of new information that leads the solver to a solution (e.g., 
Langley & Jones, 1988; Simon, 1977). In the present study, re-encoding is defined as when 
a solver switches to a different problem word to try and find a solution after failing with 
a previous word. From the previous example, rather than switching to a new meaning of 
the word “star”, a solver might switch to a new problem word to try and find the solution. 
Trying to find an associate of “house” may lead to the correct solution. Re-encoding is 
therefore changing the space of possible solution candidates by abandoning a search of 
a space defined by the current target problem word and switching to a different target 
problem word in an attempt to find a solution.
Constraint relaxation occurs as problem solvers relax their ideas of how the objects 
can be used or relax their ideas of what the problem is asking. Because CRA problems are 
relatively simple and the instructions and goals are well-defined, it is unlikely that verbal 
protocols will reveal many, if any, signs of constraint relaxation. Therefore, the present 
coding scheme has nothing which corresponds to constraint relaxation. Examples of 
some coded instances of restructuring can be seen in Figure 1.
Using Verbal Protocols to Examine CRA Insight
The study presented in this paper was designed to examine whether CRA problems solved 
with a subjective insight experience show objective characteristics of insight problem 
solving such as impasses and representational restructuring. The results are important 
because they should help to interpret both prior and future studies using CRA problems 
to study insight. A verbal protocol analysis of participants’ CRA problem-solving efforts 
was used to determine if CRA problems subjectively rated as solved with insight exhibit 
more impasses, fixation, and restructuring than problems subjectively rated as solved with 
noninsight. Secondly, the verbal protocols were used to determine if solutions emerge 
differently after restructuring for problems judged as insight than problems judged as 
noninsight. The protocols were also used to determine if quick solutions judged as insight, 
based only on suddenness of solution (i.e., the first thing thought of ), may be different 
from insights that occur later in problem solving.
The first hypothesis examines whether there are multiple types of problem-solving 
processes that lead participants to classify a solved problem as insight. It is hypothesized 
that participants will provide ratings of insight for problems solved when the first candidate 
generated is correct as well as for problems solved when the first candidate generated 
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is not correct. The solutions in which the first candidate generated is correct will not be 
used to examine the second hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis assesses to what degree the classic components of insight, 
obtained from the insight literature, predict whether a participant will rate a CRA problem 
solution as insight. It is hypothesized that insight solutions should exhibit greater amounts 
of impasse and fixation than noninsight solutions (Hypothesis 2A-2B). Specifically, there 
should be more evidence of impasses for problems solved with insight than noninsight 
(Hypothesis 2A). Also, insight solutions should have greater fixation, as measured by fewer 
candidates generated for problems solved with insight than noninsight (Hypothesis 2B). 
The fixation and impasses should lead to an increase in restructuring such that insight 
solutions contain more evidence of restructuring than noninsight solutions (Hypothesis 
2C-2D). Specifically, based on the coding scheme, there should be more evidence of re-
structuring for problems solved with insight than noninsight (Hypothesis 2C). 
Also, if insight-producing restructuring processes lead to the solution, then the pro-
portion of problems containing instances of restructuring just prior to solution should be 
higher for problems solved with insight than problems solved with noninsight (Hypothesis 
2D). Ohlsson (1992) hypothesized that, for the insight experience to occur, the change in 
representation of the problem must bring the goal state within the horizon of the mental 
look-ahead. In other words, the representation change will trigger insight only when the 
path to solution is short and quickly obtainable following restructuring. Consistent with 
Ohlsson’s (1992) hypothesis, the presence of restructuring immediately preceding solu-
tion may be more associated with insight solutions than noninsight solutions. Insight 
solutions should therefore have a shorter time to solution after the final restructuring 
and fewer candidate solutions generated between the final instance of restructuring and 
solution. For noninsight solutions, after the final restructuring, the solver may still need 
to spend more time retrieving the solution, contributing to a situation in which the “Aha!” 
is not experienced. To investigate Hypothesis 2D, the present study examines whether 
solutions that are generated within a few seconds of restructuring are more likely to be 
classified as insight than noninsight.
CRA problems may not exhibit evidence supporting all of these hypotheses. However, 
the hypotheses that are supported should provide some guidance concerning which 
aspects of insight can be fruitfully studied with CRA problems.
Method
Participants
Participants were 31 undergraduates at Mississippi State University who received course 
credit for their participation. All participants were native English speakers.
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Design
The design was a 2 (verbal-task: verbalization, nonverbalization) x 3 (solution-type: insight, 
noninsight, other) within-subject design. Solution-type was measured by the ratings 
given by the participants, rather than manipulated. The presentation order of verbal-task 
conditions was counterbalanced across participants.
Materials
The task, described as word association problems to participants, consisted of a set of 60 
CRA problems taken from a larger set of 144 normed CRA items (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 
2003b). Problems were chosen based on information from a baseline study at Mississippi 
State University using all 144 problems. The 60 problems with the highest solution rates 
that had been solved with insight about half of the time were included in the set in order 
to get a large number of correct solutions per solution-type. An additional six problems 
were used for practice trials. The problems were presented in random order and randomly 
assigned to verbal-task condition for each participant. The problems were displayed on 
a 17-inch computer monitor and answers were given by typing on a keyboard. The task 
procedure was implemented using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 
2002). Concurrent verbal protocols were obtained via headset and recorded using E-Prime.
Procedure
Participants were run individually. After receiving informed consent, participants were 
instructed on the task and given instructions for classifying a problem’s solution as insight, 
noninsight, or other. These instructions were taken from Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) and 
Kounios et al. (2006): A feeling of insight is a kind of “Aha!” characterized by suddenness 
and obviousness. You may not be sure how you came up with the answer, but you are 
relatively confident that it is correct. The answer seemed to come into your mind all at 
once (“It just popped into my head”; “Of course!”; “That’s it!”; “That’s so obvious”). This 
feeling does not have to be overwhelming, but should resemble what was just described. 
A noninsight rating is when you strategically searched for the answer by combining pos-
sible solutions with each of the three problem words until you felt you had the correct 
solution. The answer did not just pop into your head, and you felt you had to search for 
the answer. A rating of ‘other’ means that you did not know whether the solution was 
solved with or without insight, you already knew the solution, or you just guessed. The 
experimenter gave examples of each rating and answered any questions the participants 
had about the tasks and the rating scale to ensure all instructions were clearly understood. 
Then the participants read the instructions for a second time presented on the computer.
For the verbalization condition, participants were instructed on how to verbalize their 
thoughts during problem-solving efforts based on the concurrent think-aloud instruc-
tions found in the appendix of Ericsson and Simon (1993):
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In this experiment we are interested in what you think about when you find an-
swers to some questions that I am going to ask you to answer. In order to do this 
I am going to ask you to THINK ALOUD as you work on the problem given. What 
I mean by think aloud is that I want you to tell me EVERYTHING you are thinking 
from the time you first see the question until you give an answer. I would like you 
to talk aloud CONSTANTLY from the time I present each problem until you have 
given your final answer to the question. I don’t want you to try to plan out what 
you say or try to explain to me what you are saying. Just act as if you are alone in 
the room speaking to yourself. It is most important that you keep talking. If you are 
silent for any long period of time I will ask you to talk. [Please try to talk clear and 
loud enough for someone to understand what you are saying.] Do you understand 
what I want you to do? (p. 378)
After providing this explanation, the experimenter then provided the participant with 
some practice problems to help them understand how to provide concurrent verbaliza-
tions of problem-solving behavior. These think-aloud instructions were used to obtain 
concurrent verbalizations of problem-solving behavior with minimal interference from 
problem-solving processes. Participants who completed the verbalization condition first 
were given instructions and training in how to verbalize their thoughts before the first 
task and told that they did not have to think aloud anymore right before the second task. 
For the rest of the participants, think-aloud instructions were given after completing the 
nonverbalization condition.
Participants were given three practice CRA problems before each verbal-task condi-
tion to make sure that they understood the difference in responses for rating a problem 
(insight, noninsight, and other), were verbalizing (or not) correctly, and understood the 
task requirements. The practice problems may have also helped to reduce any carryover 
effects from prior verbalization. After completing the practice trials, participants began 
the CRA task.
Each CRA problem was presented for a maximum of 30 seconds. The three words 
making up the problem were presented on separate lines in the middle of the screen. 
Participants could give a solution at any time during the 30 second interval by typing their 
answer. If the given solution was incorrect, they could continue work on the problem until 
the 30-second time limit. Upon solution, participants were prompted to give a rating of 
whether they solved the problem via insight, noninsight, or other. The order of ratings was 
counterbalanced so that for half of the participants a rating of 1 was insight and a rating 
of 3 was noninsight and, for the other half, a rating of 1 was noninsight and a rating of 3 
was insight. After a rating was given or the problem remained unsolved for the 30-second 
time limit, the next problem was presented. Thirty problems were presented and then the 
participant was asked to stop and notify the experimenter. The experimenter then gave 
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the participant the appropriate instructions for the second verbal-task condition; after 
which, the participant continued to solve the remaining 30 problems.
Data Analysis
Coding scheme
The verbal protocols for solved problems were coded for occurrences of impasse and 
restructuring. The coding categories for each variable (impasse and restructuring) were 
derived from Fleck and Weisberg (2004). Five types of impasse were coded (rereading, 
discontinuing, no-new, regenerating, and frustration) and two types of restructuring were 
coded (elaboration and re-encoding) as described earlier. One clarification about no-new 
impasses is that they were coded if a participant stopped generating new solution can-
didates for at least 10 seconds, but all participants were given a standard 5 seconds to 
read and encode the problem before assessing for a “no-new” impasse. Two independent 
raters coded the data, and agreement between raters on the number of total impasses 
(Pearson r = .84, Kendall’s tau = .77) and restructuring instances per problem (Pearson 
r = .77, Kendall’s tau = .71) was good. The differences between coders were resolved by 
having coder 1 re-examine all disagreements. Most disagreements were cases of either 
coder 1 or 2 missing an instance of impasse or restructuring, and the final version of the 
data simply included these missed instances. Unfortunately, coder 2 was not available for 
discussion of the disputes so one of the authors not involved in coding reviewed any re-
maining disagreements. Although the protocols were coded for all occurrences of impasse 
and restructuring, sometimes resulting in multiple instances per problem, all analyses 
examine the presence (1) or absence (0) of impasse and restructuring in each problem.
Mixed effects modeling approach
The data were analyzed using mixed effects models as opposed to analysis of variance 
or least squares regression because mixed effects models have a number of advantages 
over these other approaches (e.g., Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Jaeger, 2008). In 
particular there are two distinct advantages for this approach with the current data. One 
is that mixed effects models allow for both participants and problems to be modeled as 
random effects (as opposed to doing separate by-subject and by-items analyses). The 
second advantage is that a logistic regression approach can be used (i.e., a logit mixed 
model) to examine the presence or absence of impasses and restructuring in each prob-
lem that participants solved (e.g., Jaeger, 2008). The analyses are reported in regression 
tables when more than one predictor was included in a model and in-text when only one 
predictor was used. When more than one factor was used as a predictor in an analysis, 
the modeling approach used was to include both factors and the interaction between 
factors in the initial model and then drop the interaction term if it was not significant (α 
= .05). Participants and problems were treated as random effects in all analyses.
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Verbal overshadowing
Concurrent verbalization of cognitive processing has been shown to inhibit solving a prob-
lem with insight (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). However, other research suggests that 
differences in verbalization instructions and the nature of the task differentially influence 
problem solving processes and, by utilizing concurrent verbalization and not requiring 
the verbalization of visuospatial representations, verbalizing does not necessarily inhibit 
solutions by insight (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). This analysis is 
not an assessment of whether CRA problems are insight problems, but instead, is meant 
to assess whether the protocols may be used to examine insight. If verbalization effects 
are similar for insight and noninsight solutions, then there is evidence that the cognitive 
processes underlying insight and noninsight solutions are not differentially affected by 
verbalization and comparisons can be made between insight and noninsight solutions.
In order to examine verbal overshadowing, whether a problem was solved or not 
was used as a dependent variable with verbal-task as a predictor. The fit of this model is 
shown in Table 1. There was evidence of verbal overshadowing because the coefficient 
for verbal-task condition was different from zero reflecting the fact that more problems 
were solved in the nonverbalization condition than in the verbalization condition. The 
number of problems solved in each verbal-task condition for each solution-type is shown 
in Table 2.
In order to examine whether verbalization affected the proportion of solutions clas-
sified as insight by participants, solution-type was used as the dependent variable in a 
mixed logit model with verbal-task condition as the predictor. Due to the low frequency 
of the “other” solution-type and the fact that only two levels of the dependent variable 
could be used, the “other” solution-type was excluded from this analysis and all subse-
quent verbal overshadowing analyses. The second analysis shown in Table 1 shows that 
verbal-task did not affect the relative proportion of solved problems classified as insight 
and noninsight. The significance of the intercept in this model is interpretable as reflecting 
the fact that more solved problems were classified as insight than noninsight.
The impact of verbalization on solution times was analyzed using a mixed effects 
model with verbal-task and solution-type as predictors presented at the bottom of Table 
1. Solution times were longer for noninsight than insight solutions and solution times 
were also longer for the verbalization than the nonverbalization condition, but there was 
no interaction. Verbalization decreased the proportion of problems solved and increased 
solution time but did not differentially affect insight and noninsight solutions.
As an additional check on the impact of verbalization, the data for the participants 
who were in the nonverbalization condition first were analyzed separately. It could be 
argued that these participants would be the only ones not affected by verbalization in-
structions because they did not encounter those instructions until the second half of the 
study. This group’s results did not differ from those reported above, and in general, there 
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were no effects of counterbalancing the order of solution-type categories or verbalization 
task conditions within subjects, so these factors were not included in the reported analyses.
Results
Four participants were excluded from all analyses because they reported solving problems 
only with insight or search but not both. Three participants were excluded because they 
did not verbalize any solution candidates even after prompting to verbalize.
Participants solved an average of 55% (SD = 11%) of problems. For solved problems, 
the average participant reported solution by insight 56% (SD = 14%) of the time, noninsight 
32% (SD = 16%) of the time, and other 12% (SD = 12%) of the time. The mean solution times 
and frequencies of these solution categories are shown in Table 2. Because the primary 
question of interest focuses on insight and noninsight solutions, the other category of 
solutions were dropped for all analyses, and solution-type (i.e., insight/noninsight) was 
treated as a categorical dependent variable.
Factors Predicting Insight
A qualitative examination of the protocols found that many insight solutions had the 
property that the solution was generated quickly and was the first candidate solution 
verbalized by the participant. In order to examine this observation quantitatively, solu-
tion time and the number of candidates were used as predictors of solution-type (insight 
Table 1
Summary of the analyses relevant to verbal overshadowing
Dependent Measure Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z t p
Solved/Not Solved
Intercept 0.35 .15 2.42 .02
Verbal-task -0.23 .11 -2.05 .04
Insight/Noninsight
Intercept 0.63 .19 3.35 .0008
Verbal-task 0.08 .17 0.47 .64
Solution-type (s)
Intercept 8.19 .50 16.36 < .0001
Verbal-task 1.28 .45 2.82 .005
Solution-type 4.14 .49 8.46 < .0001
Note. Verbal-task was coded as 0 for nonverbalization and 1 for verbalization in the coding used to 
convert factors to regressors. Solution-type was coded as 0 for insight and 1 noninsight. t is reported 
for models with a continuous dependent measure. Wald Z is reported for logit models with a binary 
dependent measure.
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coded as 0, noninsight as 1). Solution times for solved problems were measured from 
the time the problem appeared until the correct solution was entered. This analysis can 
be seen in the first part of Table 3, where there are effects of the number of candidates, 
solution time, and an interaction. Consistent with the qualitative observation from the 
protocols, the effect of the number of candidates shows that the likelihood of a problem 
being classified as insight decreased as more candidates were generated. Increased solu-
tion time was also associated with a lower likelihood of a solution being an insight solu-
tion. However, the interaction term shows that increased solution time and an increased 
number of candidates were associated with a slightly higher likelihood of a problem 
being classified as insight. These results are consistent with the observation that some 
problems are classified as insight when the solution if found immediately or soon after 
starting the problem while other problems are classified as insight after a longer delay 
between problem presentation and solution.
Based on this analysis and the observation in the protocols, solutions were catego-
rized into two categories of a solution-timing factor. The first type of solution-timing, 
termed “immediate” occurred when the first candidate solution verbalized was the solu-
tion while problems with multiple verbalized candidate solutions were categorized as 
“nonimmediate”. When solution-timing is included in the analysis of solution-type, the 
number of candidates and the interaction of candidates and solution time are no longer 
Table 2
Frequency of solution type and mean solution time for CRA problems
Solution Type N M SD
Insight
     No Think Aloud 232 8.16 s 5.63 s
     Immediate 171 7.10 s 2.73 s
     Nonimmediate 47 15.49 s 7.25 s
Noninsight
     No Think Aloud 132 11.56 s 7.36 s
     Immediate 47 7.84 s 3.02 s
     Nonimmediate 71 17.64 s 5.92 s
Other
     No Think Aloud 52 11.99 s 7.72 s
     Immediate 17 8.38 s 3.24 s
     Nonimmediate 25 18.69 s 5.80 s
Unsolved
     No Think Aloud 304 - -
     Think Aloud 342 - -
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significant and the resulting model is shown as the second analysis in Table 3. In this 
analysis, solution-timing is the best predictor of solution-type with some significant but 
reduced effect of solution time.
A participant may report a quickly solved problem as insight simply because the solu-
tion occurred so fast that it seemed sudden and surprising. However, it is unclear whether 
this type of solution should be grouped together with nonimmediate-insight solutions. 
It may be that the component cognitive processes in the case of a nonimmediate-insight 
solution are different from those involved in an immediate-insight solution. In the subse-
quent analyses, immediate and nonimmediate solutions are separated so that the protocol 
data can be used to examine what factors predict when a nonimmediate solution will be 
classified as insight. In other words, the immediate solutions are those where there is a 
relatively quick solution likely to be classified as insight, and there is correspondingly not 
much data to analyze in the verbal protocols. Therefore, only nonimmediate solutions are 
included in subsequent analyses.
However, there were also some solutions in the immediate category where solution 
time was relatively long (i.e., greater than 15 s; N= 8). These are likely solutions where 
participants forgot to verbalize during problem solving. We conducted each analysis 
including all of these solutions as immediate solutions or including these solutions as 
nonimmediate solutions. The results of these different versions of analyses did not differ, 
so these solutions were excluded from all subsequent analyses.
Table 3
Summary of the analyses of solution-type (insight = 0) for all solved problems
Dependent Measure Predictor Coefficient SE z p
Insight/Noninsight
Intercept -4.27 0.64 -6.70 < .001
Number Candidates Generated 0.24 0.05 5.04 < .001
Solution Time (s) 1.49 0.42 3.57 < .001
Number Candidates Generated 
x Solution Time
-.07 0.02 -3.70 < .001
Insight/Noninsight
Intercept -0.64 0.56 -1.15 .25
Solution Time (s) 0.07 0.03 2.36 .02
Solution-timing -1.40 0.38 -3.66 < .001
Note. Solution-timing was coded as 0 for nonimmediate solutions and 1 for immediate solutions in the 
coding used to convert factors to regressors.
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Factors Predicting Nonimmediate Insight
Impasses and fixation
Impasses were examined using the coding scheme developed for the verbal protocol 
data to identify problems in which impasses occurred. The range for the number of 
impasses occurring in a problem was between 0 and 3. The proportion of problems in 
which impasses occurred is shown in Table 4. Impasses were relatively rare so impasses 
were examined as being present/absent and only by combining all of the impasse types 
into a single impasse present/absent variable. Hypothesis 2A was not supported because 
the presence of an impasse was not a significant predictor of whether a nonimmediate 
solution was classified as insight or noninsight (|Wald z| < 1).
The fixation analysis examined the number of and rate of unique candidate solutions 
generated during problem solving. The number of candidates generated and candidate 
generation rates are sown in Table 4. These measures were used as a metric that should be 
inversely correlated with fixation. A higher rate of candidate solution generation without 
repeating previously rejected candidates means that less time is spent in periods where 
no progress is being made or being spent retrieving previously rejected candidates. There 
was no difference in the number of candidates generated for nonimmediate-insight and 
nonimmediate-noninsight solutions (Wald z = 1.42, p = .16). The analysis of generation 
rates found that nonimmediate-insight solutions had a higher generation rate than 
nonimmediate-noninsight solutions (Wald z = -2.095, p = .04), implying that, contrary 
to Hypothesis 2B, less fixation may be associated with classifying a problem as being 
solved by insight.
Restructuring
Restructuring was examined in two ways. The first analysis used the coding scheme de-
veloped for the verbal protocol data to identify problems in which restructuring occurred. 
The range for the number of restructuring instances that occurred in a problem was be-
tween 0 and 3. The proportion of problems in which restructuring occurred is shown in 
Table 4. Restructuring was relatively rare, so restructuring was examined as being present/
absent and only by combining all of the restructuring types into a single restructuring 
present/absent variable. Contrary to Hypothesis 2C, the presence of restructuring was 
not a significant predictor of whether a nonimmediate solution was classified as insight 
or noninsight (|Wald z| < 1).
The second analysis for restructuring was done to see if restructuring that occurred 
soon before a solution was more likely to lead to an insight classification for nonimmedi-
ate solutions (Hypothesis 2D). The amount of time between restructuring and solution 
and the number of solution candidates generated after restructuring but before solution 
are two different measures of how quickly a problem was solved following restructur-
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ing. These two metrics were both used in an analysis of the nonimmediate solutions 
that contained restructuring and the results were suggestive but nonsignificant. Using 
only nonimmediate problems containing restructuring is required because the number 
of candidates or amount of time between restructuring and solution is only defined for 
problems containing any restructuring. Therefore, the two metrics were combined to form 
a categorical variable which was coded as 1 only for problems where a single candidate 
(i.e., the solution) was generated within 3 s of the final occurrence of restructuring in the 
problem. Three seconds was used because across all problems with any restructuring there 
was a clear distribution with a long flat tail occurring after 3 s. The choice of whether 2, 3, 
or 4 s is used as the cutoff does not influence the result of the analysis. This restructuring-
preceding-solution variable was set to 0 for all other nonimmediate solutions (including 
those without restructuring), and it was used as a predictor of solution-type. In support 
of Hypothesis 2D, when restructuring preceded a nonimmediate solution the problem 
was more likely to be classified as insight (Wald z = -2.04, p = .04).
Discussion
The purpose of the experiment was to determine if CRA problems that are subjectively 
classified as being solved with insight exhibit characteristics of insight beyond the “Aha!” 
Table 4
Mean proportion of nonimmediate solutions in each solution-type containing each impasse type and 
restructuring type and candidate solution generation rate
Solution-Type
Predictor Nonimmediate-Insight Nonimmediate-Noninsight
Any Impasse Present .21 (.41) .30 (.46)
     Rereading .06 (.25) .07 (.26)
     Regenerating .02 (.15) 0 (0)
     Discontinuing .02 (.15) .06 (.23)
     No New .11 (.31) .17 (.38)
     Frustration .11 (.31) .07 (.26)
Any Restructuring Present .77 (.43) .63 (.49)
     Reencoding .72 (.45) .58 (.50)
     Elaboration .09 (.28) .08 (.28)
Candidates 2.57 (.95) 2.68 (1.22)
Candidate Rate (per s)* .19 (.09) .16 (.06)
RPS* .66 (.48) .44 (.50)
Note. RPS = Restructuring-preceding-solution. * = predicts insight/noninsight classification.
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experience. Participants solved a set of CRA problems while either remaining silent or 
while providing concurrent verbalization of their problem-solving processes. In order to 
analyze problem-solving behavior for evidence of insight in problems reported as being 
solved with insight, the verbal protocols were coded for occurrences of behaviors typi-
cal of the classic components of insight: impasse, fixation, and restructuring. To ensure 
the verbal protocols could be used as data, a verbal overshadowing manipulation check 
was performed. There was a verbal overshadowing effect for CRA problems resulting in 
a fewer number of solutions in the verbalization condition, but verbalization did not dif-
ferentially affect insight and noninsight solutions. Because verbalization did not interact 
with solution-type, it seems likely that verbalization had similar effects on both nonin-
sight and insight solution processes. The distribution of solution times was very similar 
for insight and noninsight in both the verbalization and nonverbalization conditions 
supporting the conclusion that verbalization did not differentially affect problem-solving 
processes in these conditions. This conclusion is similar to that in other protocol research 
on insight (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004). Therefore, the protocol data can be used to investigate 
the differences between CRA problems reported as being solved with insight and those 
reported as being solved with noninsight.
The verbal protocol data made it clear that there are multiple problem-solving pro-
cesses that lead to a solution being classified as insight. The results show that, consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, there were two apparently different problem-solving processes that 
participants grouped together into the insight solution category. Immediate solutions 
were ones in which the correct candidate was the first candidate generated, and these 
problems were quickly solved and often rated as insight. Nonimmediate solutions were 
those solutions in which more than one candidate was produced. Immediate-insight solu-
tions had little to no observable characteristics of insight, due to their rapid solution, and 
may be solutions to problems where the first word that came to mind was the answer. 
Participants may have reported insight simply because the answer was sudden and re-
sembled an “Aha!”. For nonimmediate-insight solutions, the initial candidate retrieved is 
incorrect and the solution must be obtained through further search or a re-representation 
of the problem, somehow bringing the solution suddenly into consciousness and invok-
ing an “Aha!” feeling.
Immediate solutions provide no verbal protocol data to analyze. Because the first 
candidate generated is correct, there is no evidence of impasses or restructuring. The only 
predictor of insight for immediate solutions is the subjective “Aha!” feeling. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2, concerning which components of insight are predictive of classifying a 
solution as insight, could only be examined for nonimmediate solutions.
The four sub-hypotheses, 2A-2D assessed what, other than a sudden “Aha!” expe-
rience, predicts when a solution is classified as insight by examining the presence of 
behaviors characteristic of insight: impasse, fixation, and restructuring. They stated that 
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solutions classified as insight should contain more evidence of impasse, fixation, restruc-
turing, and restructuring-preceding-solution than solutions classified as noninsight. The 
results for nonimmediate solutions show no differences between insight solutions and 
noninsight solutions in the proportion of problems containing impasse (Hypothesis 2A). 
Hypothesis 2B concerns whether problems solved with insight contain more evidence of 
fixation. Fixation was measured as the number and rate of candidates generated during 
problem solving. It was hypothesized that participants would generate fewer candidates 
at a slower rate, indicating greater fixation, for problems solved with insight than prob-
lems solved with noninsight. The results for nonimmediate solutions show there was no 
difference in the number of candidates generated for problems solved with insight and 
problems solved with noninsight. However, contrary to predictions, the rate of candidates 
generated was greater for problems solved with insight than problems solved with non-
insight. The latter effect is due to the fact that insight solutions were solved faster than 
noninsight solutions while a similar number of candidates were generated for the two 
solution categories. It is possible that producing more candidates within a given period 
of time reduces fixation. It is also possible that getting stuck at an impasse, and resolving 
it through restructuring quickly, reduces solution time (increasing candidate generation 
rate) and contributes to the problem being classified as insight (Hypothesis 2D).
The fact that there was very little evidence of impasse in any of the protocols may 
signify that CRA problems are relatively easy problems and encountering a lengthy 
impasse may be rare. Impasses, as we have operationally defined them, often require a 
specified period of time without progress. However, at least in CRA problems, it seems 
likely that restructuring may be triggered by some difficulty in generating a new candidate 
solution that does not meet the definition of impasse. The lack of impasses may therefore 
be a limitation of the coding scheme used in this study. In fact, the result that candidate 
generation rate is higher for insight problems may imply that many temporary difficul-
ties in generating solutions were overcome quickly without becoming more extended 
impasses that were captured by the coding scheme. Therefore the analysis of the rate of 
new candidates may be related to impasses, but candidate generation rate may tap into 
shorter-term difficulties not classified as impasses.
Although there is little evidence that solvers reach impasses in CRA problem solv-
ing, this does not rule out the idea that insight may occur at solution through restructur-
ing. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2C, the results for nonimmediate solutions show 
no differences between insight solutions and noninsight solutions in the proportion of 
problems containing restructuring. It seems as though restructuring in the CRA task is a 
relatively easy process and is a normal part of the CRA problem-solving process, regard-
less of solution-type. In classic insight problems, such as the classic candle problem used 
in Fleck & Weisberg (2004), correct restructuring leads to the solution, and thus insight. 
Elaboration and reencoding in these types of problems is difficult. Switching to a new 
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target problem word, or to a different meaning of the word, in the CRA task is less diffi-
cult. Although the presence of restructuring was not a predictor of self-reported insight, 
the results for nonimmediate solutions do show that restructuring occurring just prior to 
solution was more associated with insight than noninsight (Hypothesis 2D).
More important than whether restructuring occurred in solution of a CRA problem 
may be how the solution emerges as the result of the restructuring. Problems in which 
restructuring was followed immediately by generation of the solution (within 3 s) were 
more likely to be classified as insight than noninsight. Ohlsson (1992) suggests that 
solutions would be classified as insight if, after restructuring, the solution is quickly and 
easily attainable. It may be that in some cases restructuring leads to the quick retrieval of 
a new candidate solution which in turn leads to an “Aha!” experience. In other cases, the 
restructuring may lead to a more delayed retrieval leading to solution (i.e., noninsight) 
and a lack of a subjective “Aha!” experience. For example, following restructuring, one or 
two candidate answers could be retrieved and rejected followed by the retrieval of the 
answer. This slower solution process following restructuring may then lead to a nonin-
sight classification. With respect to the results showing that there is a greater candidate 
generation rate for insight solutions, it may be that the extra time spent retrieving one 
or two incorrect candidate solutions following restructuring leads to the longer solution 
time (and correspondingly lower candidate generation rate) for noninsight solutions. This 
reasoning relates the results contradicting Hypothesis 2B, concerning candidate genera-
tion rate, with the results in support of Hypothesis 2D.
Based on these results, it seems that CRA problems may be useful in studying restruc-
turing processes leading to insight in the last few seconds prior to solution. In fact, this 
finding corresponds well with what has been done in neuroimaging studies in the past 
leading to the theory that insight may have a greater right temporal lobe contribution 
due to more coarse-coding in the right hemisphere (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Bowden 
& Beeman, 1998). The fact that nonimmediate-insight solutions were more similar to 
nonimmediate-noninsight solutions than they were to immediate-insight solutions 
means that using the subjective “Aha!” experience as a marker of insight might not be 
a reliable indicator of impasse and restructuring processes, or at least it indicates that 
different problem-solving processes can lead to similar subjective insight experiences. 
It is therefore important to distinguish between these solution processes. Paraphrasing 
Newell (1973), the effect of averaging over methods “conceals, rather than reveals” (p. 
295) any true effect. In fact, given the large proportion of insight solutions falling into the 
immediate category, our results would have been drastically different had we not made 
this distinction.
Neuroimaging studies using CRA problems have found more activity in the right 
anterior superior temporal gyrus, possibly indicating the sudden emergence of the cor-
rect solution, that may be facilitated by cognitive control activity prior to problem onset 
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in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; 
Subramaniam et al., 2009). However, without sub-categorizing insight solutions into those 
likely to contain and not likely to contain restructuring it is difficult to determine to what 
extent this activation is indicative of restructuring processes or indicative of other pro-
cesses tied more to the subject “Aha!” experience. In other words, the activation patterns 
may represent some processes related to insight but there might be additional areas as-
sociated with the restructuring encountered just prior to nonimmediate-insight solutions 
that were not seen in these past analyses. For example, an immediate-insight solution 
contains evidence of the “Aha!” experience but not restructuring. Nonimmediate-insight 
solutions contain evidence of both the “Aha!” experience and restructuring. Therefore, in 
neuroimaging studies examining insight using CRA problems, subtracting the activation 
of immediate-insight solutions from nonimmediate-insight solutions may reveal brain 
regions associated with restructuring while subtracting out processes responsible for the 
“Aha!” experience. This example is just one benefit coming out of the investigation of the 
components making up insight solutions to CRA problems.
In a preliminary neuroimaging investigation of CRA problem solving (Cranford & Moss, 
2011), we found nonimmediate-insight and noninsight solutions produced similar patterns 
of activation, both different from immediate-insight solutions. Nonimmediate-insight 
solutions did have greater activation in the aforementioned anterior cingulate cortex 
and right middle temporal gyrus than noninsight solutions suggesting nonimmediate-
insight may be a result of heightened activation of words more distantly connected to 
the problem word, in line with prior findings showing right hemisphere contributions to 
insight CRA problem solving (Haarmann, George, Smaliy, & Dien, 2012; Jung-Beeman et 
al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Subramaniam et al., 2009). However, there were differences 
between immediate- and nonimmediate-insight solutions that have not been observed 
before and might be associated with restructuring. A finer-grained analysis of insight 
solution processes should lead to improved understanding of the neural correlates of 
insight including the circumstances under which restructuring leads to insight and when 
it does not.
An alternative interpretation of the null results for Hypotheses 2A and 2C is that the 
coding criteria used do not adequately capture behaviors indicative of insight and thus 
are inherently not predictive of insight. For example, reencoding may be just as likely to 
capture behavior indicative of taking a next step in a systematic search strategy as it is to 
capture restructuring behavior. However, switching to new problem words or switching 
to new meanings of the problem words seems to be the only observable measures of 
representation change in CRA problem solving. Future studies should seek to determine 
if there are any other possible measures of impasse or restructuring that can be used to 
predict insight in CRA problem solving, or more generally ascertain what determines when 
a CRA problem is rated as being solved with insight.
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A second limitation of the current study is that verbalization may have affected the 
results. While the available evidence indicates that verbalization did not differentially 
affect insight and noninsight solution processes, the possibility can not be completely 
ruled out. It may be that many of the immediate solutions were actually problems where 
participants failed to verbalize and that this lack of verbalization led to an increased likeli-
hood of an insight solution classification. One way to address this would be to replicate the 
current study but instead of relying on protocols to classify solutions as either immediate 
or nonimmediate, the participant could be asked whether the solution was just the first 
thing that he/she though of. This method was used in the fMRI study mentioned before 
(Cranford & Moss, 2011). It may also be possible to prompt participants to restructure their 
representation by manipulating a prompt telling them which word in the CRA problem 
to focus on. The prediction here would be that insight solutions would be more likely to 
quickly follow these manipulated reencoding prompts than would noninsight solutions.
CRA problems are useful problems to study insight because they can be solved by 
insight or noninsight processes and are short and simple problems allowing for many trial 
presentations within a single session. However, because of these facts, CRA problems are 
different from classic insight problems. The protocols of individual CRA problems reveal 
much less verbalization than would be seen in most classic insight problems. Many of 
the CRA problems do not show any evidence of a restructuring and/or impasse. In addi-
tion, the types of restructuring and impasses encountered in CRA problem are relatively 
limited given the well-defined nature of these problems and the limited number of search 
operators that can be applied. It is unclear whether the types of restructuring observable 
in these problems are caused by similar cognitive or neural processes as more complex 
problems. These are limitations that should be addressed in future research on the be-
havioral and neural basis of restructuring and insight.
In conclusion, CRA problem solutions were found to be classified as being solved 
with insight when the first candidate solution was generated quickly and was correct as 
well as when the solution was obtained after more problem solving activity. Therefore, 
the same phenomenological experience and classification may result from two poten-
tially different problem-solving processes. The nonimmediate-insight solutions seem 
to resemble classic insight more than the immediate type and are a slightly better fit 
to the traditional definition of insight because, in the verbal protocols, there was more 
evidence of restructuring preceding solution for nonimmediate-insight solutions than 
nonimmediate-noninsight solutions. These results imply that CRA problems could be 
used to examine these restructuring processes. Hence, future work would benefit from 
differentiating immediate- and nonimmediate-insight solutions. By pulling apart the two 
types of insight solutions, the processes of insight can be further explored.
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